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Abstract
QuickPay is a system for micro payments aiming to avoid
the cost of cryptographic operations during payments. An
operational model of the system has been built to assist
in the search for weaknesses in the protocols. As a result
of this model building activity, one minor weakness has
been found. Another more serious weakness has been re-
discovered and a number of solutions are proposed. The
strongest solution is proved correct.
1 Introduction
Electronic payment systems [7], like conventional pay-
ments systems, are designed to conserve money. However,
if the economic value of a transaction is low, it may be
acceptable on occasions to gain or loose payments. In a
micro payment system, each transaction represents so lit-
tle real value that the cost of preventing all gain or loss
may not oset the advantages. We study a number of
optimisations to an electronic payment system, ranging
from a provably correct, lossless optimisation to ecient
but lossy optimisations.
Most micro payment systems involve three parties: bro-
kers, merchants and customers [2, 5, 8]. The role of the
broker is to exchange `real' money for tokens. The broker
provides services to the customers and the merchants and
as such should be the most trusted party of the system.
The merchant delivers services or goods to the customer
in exchange for tokens and as such should be trusted by
the customers. Merchants do not need to be trusted by
the brokers. The brokers and merchants provide services
to the customers, which means that the customers must
have trust in both, but no one has to trust a customer.
The hierarchy in the trust model should be reected in
the protocols of the payment system.
QuickPay is a micro payment scheme with pre-
payment [1, 6]. The customer must register with the
broker to obtain an electronic carnet with value tokens
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before a sale may take place. It is possible to acquire ad-
ditional value tokens, or to refresh the value tokens at any
time. A merchant must also register with the broker to
obtain an electronic till with authentication tokens. This
will enable the merchant to validate the tokens presented
by the customer. Once customer and merchant are regis-
tered, a sale may proceed as follows. First the customer
presents one or more value tokens to the merchant. The
merchant then authenticates himself
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with the broker
and presents the customers value tokens to the broker for
validation. The broker decides whether the customers to-
kens are valid. If the merchant is satised that the tokens
are valid, goods/services may be delivered. The customer
takes delivery but does not receive a receipt.
The QuickPay philosophy is to make transactions cheap
in two ways. Firstly, oine payments are allowed al-
though they are less secure than online payments. Sec-
ondly, payment does not require cryptographic compu-
tations. This is achieved by using real (as opposed to
pseudo) random numbers as tokens. A sequence of ran-
dom numbers is generated, encrypted and transferred
when the customer or the merchant register with the bro-
ker. Creating the random numbers is ecient, as a hard-
ware device (a noisy diode) is used rather than an com-
putationally intensive algorithm. Encrypting and trans-
mitting a sequence of random numbers can be relatively
inecient. However, this is only done during registra-
tion; during payment transactions only a single random
number is transferred in clear. Systems that use crypto-
graphic computations during every transaction, such as
Millicent [2] and Mini-Pay [5], are inherently less ecient
than QuickPay but possibly more secure.
Micro payment systems raise a number of interesting
questions because they dier from normal payment sys-
tems. The present paper makes the following contribu-
tions to the understanding of micro payment systems in
general, and to that of QuickPay in particular:
 to introduce an operational model for the QuickPay
protocols, which allows real life scenarios to be stud-
ied at an appropriate level of abstraction.
 to investigate the correctness of an essential optimi-
1
We refer to a customer using the words `her' or `she' and we
refer to a merchant using the words `his' or `he'.
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sation to the basic protocol, which allows multiple
token payments to be replaced by a single token pay-
ment.
Many aspects of the real system are not modelled and
consequently cannot be studied using the present model.
The prime example is performance, which could be mod-
elled but only by a more detailed description of the system
than we present here.
The operational model of QuickPay is written with the
aid of the latos [4] tool, which provides type checking
and animation of specications. The type checking facil-
ity of the tool has been used to avoid inconsistencies in
the model, and the animation facilities have been used to
explore various transaction sequences.
Many approaches have been used to analyse crypto-
graphic protocols [10, pages 65{68]. Our work falls in the
category of approaches that bring an existing formalismto
bear on the specic problems of analysing cryptographic
protocols. The criticism levied at this approach is that the
formalisms are too general purpose and thus not speci-
cally suitable to the task. We believe that this is not the
case, and nd support for our thesis in reports from a re-
cent workshop. Ryan et al [9] survey the state of the art
in model checking of security protocols, mainly using CSP
but also Action systems and the B-method. The survey
shows that specialised logics such as BAN logic are not
necessary, other formal methods can be eective as well.
Another report from the same workshop by Gunter et
al [3] reminds us that it is dicult to model a system in an
appropriate mathematical framework, and the properties
that one can prove apply to the model and not necessarily
to the system. This caveat applies to our work also. In
particular our correctness proof applies to the model and
not necessarily to the QuickPay prototype. However, it
would be a pleasant (but unlikely) surprise if the problems
that we identied in the model do not also apply to the
prototype.
The next section briey presents the prototype imple-
mentation of QuickPay. Section 3 denes the model of
QuickPay. Section 4 presents a number of case studies
that show how QuickPay transactions are processed, and
how incorrect use of the system can be prevented. Two
problems and a number of solutions to one of the problems
are explored in Section 5.
The last section presents conclusions and discusses fur-
ther work.
2 Prototype
The QuickPay prototype has been tested on making pay-
ments over the internet. The prototype works as follows.
The customer rst starts her carnet application, which
puts up a window to inform the customer about her bal-
ance as shown below.
The customer also starts up an unrelated application
that might require payment, such as an intelligent agent
that is going to make some purchases on her behalf. For
the purpose of this example we will use a web browser,
which is being used to select a page of information from a
web server, for example http://www.merchant.com. Fig-
ure 1 shows the information provided by the server, as it
appears on the customers work station. The Web page
she is looking at is actually a schematic diagram of the
QuickPay prototype. The diagram shows the three main
parties and the (TCP/IP) connections between them.
If a page contains links that require pay-
ment, the web browser sends an http request to
http://till.merchant.com/. The merchants till ap-
plication opens a TCP/IP connection to the carnet at
the customer site (identied by her IP address) and the
carnet puts up a window asking the customer to conrm
the sale. When the customer agrees, the merchant
receives the tokens over the TCP/IP connection and
clears them with the vault application at the brokers site.
The carnet can be customised to designate merchants as
permanently trusted, or trusted for the current session.
Such merchants can help themselves to tokens without
conrmation from the customer.
If the turn over of the merchant is high, a permanent
TCP/IP connection (solid arrows) is used, otherwise a
transient connection would be better. When the merchant
is satised that the tokens have cleared, the till sends
the page to the customer as a reply to the original http
request.
The prototype implementation uses a UNIX platform
for the vault application, the till application and the web
server. The prototype oers Windows, Unix and MacOS
implementations of the carnet.
The model to be described in the next section takes
into account the core aspects of the implementation, but
abstracts away from as much detail as possible. This
strategy makes it possible to concentrate on the essentials,
keeping the model simple and elegant. Once nished, it
would be possible to rene the model so as to take on
board more detail. Ultimately this process of renement
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Figure 1: The architecture of the QuickPay prototype.
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would lead to a nely detailed model that is able to de-
scribe every aspect of the implementation. The present
work should be considered a starting point for the rene-
ment process.
The model takes into account the transactions that rely
on the TCP/IP connections, but abstracts away from the
actual protocol implementation. The model also takes
into account the three parties but it is not concerned with
the Web browser/server. These components can be re-
placed by other client/server applications and are there-
fore not relevant to the model. The model abstracts away
from the internal representations of data and messages in
the carnet, till and vault applications.
3 Model
The model represents the QuickPay book keeping by a
state, and the messages exchanged by the QuickPay proto-
cols are represented by a list of transactions. Each trans-
action causes a transformation to be applied to the state,
modelling the change in the book keeping as a result of a
message exchange in the real system.
The state of the model is described by a number of data
type denitions. The transactions that can take place are
described by a set of logical inference rules operating on
that data. Transactions and state are bound together in
a conguration, which records the present state of the
system as well as the sequence of transactions that have
yet to take place. The collection of inference rules denes
a relation over congurations. The model is animated by
computing the transitive closure of the relation.
In subsequent sections we introduce the state (s), the
transactions (tr), the relation (
qp
)) and its closure (
qp
)

).
3.1 State
The state s of the model is represented by a 3-tuple con-
sisting of the book keeping of the customers (cs), brokers
(bs), and merchants (ms).
s (cs; bs; ms);
This rather innocent looking tuple represents the ma-
jor abstraction of the model with respect to the prototype.
The latter distributes the information with the protocol
taking care that appropriate information is exchanged be-
tween the parties, but no more. The model in princi-
ples allows unlimited access to information. However, the
model has been designed in such a way that it is easy to
see (and prove) where and when information is accessed.
The basis of all book keeping is formed by numbers
and names. These will be elaborated rst. In subsequent
sections, the state of each of the parties will be discussed
in detail.
3.1.1 Scalar data
A payment system deals with numeric data and the nam-
ing of parties involved in transactions. The model uses n
for counters; a for maintaining token account values and
balances; r for random numbers; v for value tokens; and t
for authentication tokens.
a N;
n N;
r N;
v N;
t N;
The name of a customer is of type id
c
. The sux
c
indicates that this information pertains to customers only.
Similarly the name of a merchant is of type id
m
and the
name of a broker is of type id
b
.
id
c
 string;
id
b
 string;
id
m
 string;
3.1.2 Customer
The QuickPay prototype supports one broker doing busi-
ness with any number of merchants and customers. This
means that the customers and merchants do not need to
know the identity of the broker. In the case of the cus-
tomers' carnet c a representation consisting of just a list
of tokens [v] is thus adequate. Customers are unique, so a
representation of the customer data as a partial mapping
cs from customer ids id
c
to customer records c is appro-
priate.
c  [v];
cs id
c
* c;
3.1.3 Broker
The broker keeps a record of type b (below) containing
three components. The rst is a master list of random
numbers [r]. The second component is a partial mapping
from customer ids to the records ([v]; a) kept by the bro-
ker on behalf of the customers. These records contain two
components: a list of value tokens [v] and an account a.
The third component of the broker record is a partial map-
ping from merchant ids to the records ([t]; a) kept by the
broker on behalf of the merchants. These latter records
also contain two components: a list of authentication to-
kens [t] and an account a.
b ([r]; id
c
* ([v]; a); id
m
* ([t]; a));
Customer accounts function as a `budget' and are decre-
mented each time the customer purchases new tokens.
Merchant accounts function as a `balance' and are in-
cremented each time the merchant clears some tokens.
4
This symmetry constitutes a slight deviation from the real
QuickPay system, which only has merchant accounts.
We feel justied in making this deviation as the real
system incorporates an interface to conventional payment
systems, which will impose limits on the amount of tokens
that customers can introduce. The budget is thought to
model these external constraints, for it limits customer
spending.
bs id
b
* b;
The type bs represents a partial mapping from broker
ids id
b
to broker records b, with the additional constraint
that the domain of the mapping is a singleton set.
#domain(bs) = 1;
The constraint represents the fact the prototype has
only one broker. Representing bs as a mapping is perhaps
overkill, but we use it for symmetry reasons and to be
able to explore scenarios where another broker inltrates
the system.
3.1.4 Merchant
The merchant has a till (or merchant record) m that con-
tains a list of authentication tokens [t]. In addition, for
each customer the merchant records a list of value tokens
[v] received, but as yet uncleared by the broker.
The type ms represents a partial mapping from mer-
chant ids id
m
to merchant records m.
m  ([t]; id
c
* [v]);
ms id
m
* m;
This concludes the presentation of the state of the
QuickPay model. The next section describes how the state
is used in transactions.
3.2 Transactions
The model represents transactions as separate actions and
reactions. This permits actions be modelled whilst the
reaction is not forthcoming. Each transaction is labelled
and carries a number of parameters to identify the parties
involved. Some transactions require further information,
such as a token count n. The denitions below represent
`control' information of the messages transmitted in the
actual prototype; we abstract away from actual `payload'
of the real messages (i.e., the lists of tokens).
tr update(id
c
; id
b
; n) j sell(id
m
; id
c
; n) j
clear(id
b
; id
m
; id
c
) j stock(id
m
; id
b
; n) j
auth
m
(id
m
; id
b
) j auth
b
(id
b
; id
m
);
Figure 2 illustrates which parties are involved in each of
the transactions. Value tokens (indicated by thick arrows)
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Figure 2: The QuickPay parties and transactions. Thick
arrows represent value token transfer and thin arrows rep-
resent authentication token transfer.
ow from the broker to the customer (update) and then
via the merchant (sell) back to the broker (clear). The
authentication tokens (thin arrows) ow from the broker
to the merchant (stock and auth
b
) and from the mer-
chant to the broker (auth
m
).
The notion of a conguration augments the (static)
state s with a (dynamic) list of transactions [tr]. We can
now formulate the model of QuickPay as a relation
qp
)
over congurations. The type of the relation is:
qp
)
:: h[tr]; si$h[tr]; si;
The relation itself is dened using a set of inference
rules based on the following general pattern:
` : : :
[: : :] `htr : trs; (cs; bs; ms)i
qp
) htrs; (cs
0
; bs
0
; ms
0
)i;
if : : : ;
The conclusion of the rule (below the horizontal line)
isolates the current transaction tr from the remaining
transactions trs, and exposes the three components cs, bs
and ms of the current state. The premises of the rule then
assert a relationship between the current components of
the state and the new components of the state (cs
0
, bs
0
ms
0
). A rule applies only if the side condition if : : : yields
true.
The following sections present the detailed rules for
each transaction.
3.2.1 Update transaction
The update transaction supplies the customer with value
tokens. The customer is supposed to prepay these to-
kens using real money, a credit card or some other means.
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In an implementation of QuickPay this may involve ad-
ditional transactions, encryption of the tokens whilst in
transit etc. These details are not considered relevant for
the purpose of searching for weaknesses in the protocol
and are thus not modelled here. However, the eventual-
ity that tokens cannot be obtained is modelled using the
customers budget.
In the transaction as specied by the rule update
ok
(be-
low) the identities of the customer id
c
and broker id
b
, as
well as the number of tokens required n is given by the
parameters of the update (id
c
; id
b
; n) transaction.
The broker keeps a record for the customer, which is
found by looking up the broker id
b
in the mapping bs,
and then within the mapping cs
b
of the broker looking up
the customer id
c
. This yields the customer data (vs
b
c
; a
c
)
as viewed by the broker.
All mappings used in the model are partial. This means
that for example cs
b
(id
c
) may be undened, which would
be the case when broker id
b
and customer id
c
do not know
each other. This eventuality is covered by the conjunct
id
c
2 domain(cs
b
) of the side condition, which, together
with the other conjuncts ensures that the lookup opera-
tions yield a well dened result. The last conjunct of the
side condition n  a
c
asserts that the customer must not
be over budget for the transaction to succeed. Since n
represents a natural number, it is unnecessary to check
for negative values.
There are two views on the customers carnet: vs
b
c
is
the brokers view on the customers list of tokens and vs
c
c
would be the customers view on her own list of tokens.
In general the superscripts indicate the view of a partic-
ular party on some information. The subscript indicates
what the information represents. The two views on the
customers carnet may dier, if the customer has spent to-
kens with a merchant who has not (yet) cleared the tokens
with the broker. This creates the potential for misuse of
the system, as illustrated by the double spending scenario
given in Section 4.2.3.
The QuickPay protocol has been designed to be cus-
tomer friendly in that the customer is allowed to refresh
her carnet at any time. The idea is that a customer may
be using dierent computers at dierent times. When she
wishes to make a purchase, all she has to do is refresh
her carnet. There is no need to carry the carnet around
on some media. Even if she looses the computer with her
carnet, she can simply refresh the carnet using another
computer. The refresh automatically invalidates the lost
tokens.
As a consequence, the model and the prototype im-
plementation thus ignore the customers own view on the
carnet. This is the reason why vs
c
c
is not mentioned in the
rule. Instead the update transaction creates a completely
new carnet vs
0
. The carnet will contain the number of to-
kens #vs
b
c
kept in the current carnet (brokers view), plus
the number of tokens n that is currently being (pre)paid
for. The new number of tokens is represented by n
0
. The
prime signies the fact that this is new information. The
new carnet contains n
0
random numbers. (The function
take returns the rst n
0
elements of the list rs. Similarly
the function drop returns a list containing all elements of
rs except the rst n
0
.)
`bs(id
b
) = (rs; cs
b
; ms
b
);
`cs
b
(id
c
) = (vs
b
c
; a
c
);
`#vs
b
c
+ n = n
0
;
`take(n
0
; rs) = vs
0
;
`vs
0
= c
0
;
`cs
b
 fid
c
7! (vs
0
; a
c
  n)g = cs
b
0
;
`(drop(n
0
; rs); cs
b
0
; ms
b
) = b
0
[update
ok
] `hupdate(id
c
; id
b
; n) : trs; (cs; bs; ms)i
qp
)
htrs; (cs  fid
c
7! c
0
g; bs  fid
b
7! b
0
g; ms)i;
if id
c
2domain(cs)^id
b
2domain(bs)^
id
c
2domain(cs
b
)^na
c
;
[update
nok
] `hupdate(id
c
; id
b
; n) : trs; si
qp
) htrs; si;
The new customer record is c
0
, the new mapping of cus-
tomer ids to customer records is cs
b
0
and the new broker
record is b
0
. (The operator  represents functional over-
riding). The state components representing customer and
broker records are updated but the component represent-
ing merchants ms is unchanged. This shows that gather-
ing the state of all parties in a single tuple, as discussed
in Section 3.1, is safe.
The model diers from the prototype in that the latter
has been optimised to re-use random numbers, by hashing
each number with a key specic to the customer. It was
felt appropriate for the level of abstraction required to
ignore this optimisation and use a fresh batch of random
numbers each time. Both the model and the prototype
assume all random numbers to be dierent, and that there
is a sucient supply of random numbers.
In a system with more than one broker, the above trans-
action would be unsafe. Suppose that a customer has ac-
counts with two brokers, A and B. She could then refresh
the carnet obtained from A with B and vice versa.
3.2.2 Sell transaction
The sell transaction initiates a sale of goods from the mer-
chant to the customer. For a sale, the merchant id
m
looks
up his record for customer id
c
. This record vs
m
c
consists of
a list of value tokens, which is appended to the required
number of tokens n (using the ++ operator). The customer
is relieved of the same number of tokens.
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`ms(id
m
) = (ts
m
; cs
m
);
`cs(id
c
) = vs
c
c
;
`cs
m
(id
c
) = vs
m
c
;
`drop(n; vs
c
c
) = c
0
;
`cs
m
 fid
c
7! (take(n; vs
c
c
)++vs
m
c
)g = cs
m
0
;
`(ts
m
; cs
m
0
) = m
0
[sell
ok
] `hsell(id
m
; id
c
; n) : trs; (cs; bs; ms)i
qp
)
htrs; (cs  fid
c
7! c
0
g; bs; ms fid
m
7!m
0
g)i;
if id
m
2domain(ms)^id
c
2domain(cs)^
id
c
2domain(cs
m
)^n#vs
c
c
;
[sell
nok
] `hsell(id
m
; id
c
; n) : trs; si
qp
) htrs; si;
The sell transaction fails if either the customer and the
merchant do not know each other, or if the customers
carnet vs
c
c
does not at least contain the required number
n of tokens. To validate the tokens, a number of further
steps are required (auth
b
, auth
m
and clear, see below).
3.2.3 Stock transaction
Stock is for the merchant what update is for the customer.
The stock transaction replenishes the merchants till with
a fresh list of authentication tokens ts
m
0
. The tokens are
used to authenticate the merchant to the broker, and vice
versa.
The old list of tokens is not needed, which is indicated
by the wild-card . The merchant does not pay for these
tokens via conventional means, and is thus free to stock
new tokens as often as he likes. The count n therefore gives
the absolute number of fresh tokens, as opposed to the
relative number for the customers update transaction.
`bs(id
b
) = (rs; cs
b
; ms
b
);
`ms(id
m
) = (ts
m
m
; cs
m
);
`ms
b
(id
m
) = ( ; a
m
);
`take(n; rs) = ts
m
0
;
`(ts
m
0
; cs
m
) = m
0
;
`ms
b
 fid
m
7! (ts
m
0
; a
m
)g = ms
b
0
;
`(drop(n; rs); cs
b
; ms
b
0
) = b
0
[stock
ok
] `hstock(id
m
; id
b
; n) : trs; (cs; bs; ms)i
qp
)
htrs; (cs; bs  fid
b
7! b
0
g; ms fid
m
7!m
0
g)i;
if id
b
2domain(bs)^id
m
2domain(ms)^
id
m
2domain(ms
b
);
[stock
nok
] `hstock(id
m
; id
b
; n) : trs; si
qp
) htrs; si;
The stock transaction can only fail when the merchant
and the broker do not know each other.
3.2.4 Merchant authenticate transaction
Prior to clearing customer tokens, the merchant must au-
thenticate himself with the broker. This is done by com-
paring the next authentication token from the merchant
hd(ts
m
m
) with the next token from the broker hd(ts
b
m
). (The
function hd returns the head element of a list; the function
tl returns a list without its head element; an empty list
is indicated by [].) If the merchant and the broker hold
at least one authentication token each and if those to-
kens are the same, the merchant is deemed genuine. The
clause auth
nok
m
applies if the merchant is fraudulent, or if
the merchant has run out of authentication tokens, or if
the broker and the merchant do not know each other.
`bs(id
b
) = (rs; cs
b
; ms
b
);
`ms(id
m
) = (ts
m
m
; cs
m
);
`ms
b
(id
m
) = (ts
b
m
; a
b
);
`(tl(ts
m
m
); cs
m
) = m
0
;
`ms
b
 fid
m
7! (tl(ts
b
m
); a
b
)g = ms
b
0
;
`(rs; cs
b
; ms
b
0
) = b
0
[auth
ok
m
] `hauth
m
(id
m
; id
b
) : trs; (cs; bs; ms)i
qp
)
htrs; (cs; bs fid
b
7! b
0
g; ms fid
m
7!m
0
g)i;
if id
b
2domain(bs)^id
m
2domain(ms)^
id
m
2domain(ms
b
)^
ts
b
m
6=[]^ts
m
m
6=[]^hd(ts
b
m
) = hd(ts
m
m
);
[auth
nok
m
] `hauth
m
(id
m
; id
b
) : trs; si
qp
) htrs; si;
The specication above assumes that when authentica-
tion fails, the rst tokens of ts
b
m
and ts
m
m
are not consid-
ered `spent'. This may or may not be the behaviour of the
prototype; the point is that appropriate behaviour can be
specied.
3.2.5 Broker authenticate transaction
The authenticate broker transaction is almost the same
as the authenticate merchant transaction. The only dif-
ference between auth
b
and auth
m
is that the parameters
are swapped. It may seem surprising that the two trans-
actions are so similar, but this is a direct consequence
of the asymmetric design of the protocol, which uses the
same sequence of random numbers for both authentica-
tion steps.
`hauth
m
(id
m
; id
b
) : trs; si
qp
) htrs
0
; s
0
i
[auth
b
] `hauth
b
(id
b
; id
m
) : trs; si
qp
) htrs
0
; s
0
i;
3.2.6 Clear transaction
The clear transaction allows the merchant to clear the to-
kens from a given customer with the broker. This trans-
action is supposed to take place only when the merchant
and the broker have just authenticated each other.
The side condition checks that the value tokens are in-
deed amongst those vs
b
c
originally handed out to the cus-
tomer.
7
`bs(id
b
) = (rs; cs
b
; ms
b
);
`ms(id
m
) = (ts
m
m
; cs
m
);
`ms
b
(id
m
) = (ts
b
m
; a
m
);
`cs
m
(id
c
) = vs
m
c
;
`cs
b
(id
c
) = (vs
b
c
; a
c
);
`vs
m
c
= vs
m
0
c
;
`(ts
m
m
; cs
m
 fid
c
7! []g) = m
0
;
`vs
b
c
nvs
m
0
c
= vs
b
0
c
;
`ms
b
 fid
m
7! (ts
b
m
; a
m
+#vs
m
0
c
)g = ms
b
0
;
`cs
b
 fid
c
7! (vs
b
0
c
; a
c
)g = cs
b
0
;
`(rs; cs
b
0
; ms
b
0
) = b
0
[clear
ok
] `hclear(id
b
; id
m
; id
c
) : trs; (cs; bs; ms)i
qp
)
htrs; (cs; bs  fid
b
7! b
0
g; ms fid
m
7!m
0
g)i;
if id
b
2domain(bs)^id
m
2domain(ms)^
id
m
2domain(ms
b
)^id
c
2domain(cs
m
)^
id
c
2domain(cs
b
)^vs
m
0
c
 vs
b
c
;
[clear
nok
] `hclear(id
b
; id
m
; id
c
) : trs; si
qp
) htrs; si;
The premise ` vs
m
c
= vs
m
0
c
does not appear to be very
useful. It has been introduced only to facilitate the pre-
sentation of the optimisation in Section 5.3.
The clause clear
nok
applies when the merchant tries to
clear false tokens, or if one of the parties is unknown to
the others.
3.3 Closure
The collection of inference rules presented above dene a
relation
qp
) over congurations.
The model is animated by computing the transitive clo-
sure
qp
)

of the relation as shown by the function animate
below. This function takes an initial conguration and de-
livers a list of congurations showing the remaining trans-
actions and the state of the system after each transac-
tion. The initial conguration is prepended to the result
to show the starting point of the animation.
animate :: h[tr]; si![h[tr]; si];
animatehtrs; si= htrs; si : htrs; si
qp
)

;
A complete model of QuickPay has now been estab-
lished. The next section presents some examples of use.
4 Case studies
To assess the validity of the model, we will explore the
behaviour of the protocols by animating a number of sce-
narios.
4.1 Sample state
The case studies use three potential customers, a broker
and two merchants. The initial state of the system is such
that:
 All token lists are initially empty.
 The merchant and customer accounts as held by the
broker are initialised.
 The master list of random numbers held by the broker
is initialised.
The initial state s
0
is:
s
0
:: s;
s
0
= (cs
0
; bs
0
; ms
0
);
The three customers are alice, bob, and carol. Each
initially has an empty carnet.
cs
0
:: cs;
cs
0
= fhalice 7! ([])i; hbob 7! ([])i; hcarol 7! ([])ig;
The broker bank1 knows all about the two merchants
and the three customers. The customers each have a bud-
get of 100, the initial accounts of the merchants are empty.
In the animations of the model we have used subsequences
of the natural numbers by way of random sequence. (The
notation [t
x
j x s] causes x to range over the elements of
the sequence s and returns a new sequence with elements
t
x
.)
bs
0
:: bs;
bs
0
= fhbank1 7! b
1
ig
where
b
1
= (rs; cs; ms)
where
rs = [r j r [10::19]];
cs = fhalice 7! ([]; 100)i;
hbob 7! ([]; 100)i;
hcarol 7! ([]; 100)ig;
ms= fhshopy 7! ([]; 0)i;
hshopx 7! ([]; 0)ig;
;
;
There are two merchants shopx and shopy in the sys-
tem. The rst knows about all three customers, the sec-
ond knows only about alice.
ms
0
:: ms;
ms
0
= fhshopx 7! ([]; cs
x
)i; hshopy 7! ([]; cs
y
)ig
where
cs
x
= fhalice 7! []i; hbob 7! []i;
hcarol 7! []ig;
cs
y
= fhalice 7! []ig;
;
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4.2 Scenarios
The scenarios to be discussed include a correct `run' of
the protocol, and a number of incorrect ones.
4.2.1 Scenario 1: successful sale
In the rst example shopx receives the counter value of
2 tokens from alice. An animation of the sale consists
of a series of snapshots, which shows in detail how each
transaction alters the state of the system. To save space
customers or merchants with empty token lists are sup-
pressed. Similarly, if the book keeping of any customer,
broker or merchant is unaected by a transaction then
that information is suppressed.
The rst step initialises the lists of random numbers for
the broker.
bank1 [10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
! update(alice; bank1; 3) !
The customers carnet contains three value tokens. The
brokers vault contains the duplicates and shows that the
customers budget is now 97.
alice [10 11 12]
bank1 [13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
alice ([10 11 12],97)
! stock(shopx; bank1; 4)!
The till of shopx contains four authentication tokens. The
brokers vault contains the duplicates and shows that the
merchants account is 0.
bank1 [17 18 19]
alice ([10 11 12],97)
shopx ([13 14 15 16],0)
shopx [13 14 15 16]
! sell(shopx; alice; 2)!
The merchant has received the two tokens [10; 11] from
the customer.
alice [12]
shopx [13 14 15 16]
alice [10 11]
! auth
m
(shopx; bank1) !
The broker and the merchant agree that 13 is the rst
authentication token.
bank1 [17 18 19]
alice ([10 11 12],97)
shopx ([14 15 16],0)
shopx [14 15 16]
alice [10 11]
! auth
b
(bank1; shopx) !
The merchant and the broker agree that 14 is the second
authentication token.
bank1 [17 18 19]
alice ([10 11 12],97)
shopx ([15 16],0)
shopx [15 16]
alice [10 11]
! clear(bank1; shopx; alice) !
The merchant account has been credited with 2 tokens.
bank1 [17 18 19]
alice ([12],97)
shopx ([15 16],2)
shopx [15 16]
4.2.2 Scenario 2: price too high
There are several possibilities for turning the previous sce-
nario into an unsuccessful sale. The scenario below diers
from the previous in that the price of the product is now
5 tokens instead of 2.
bank1 [10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
! update(alice; bank1; 3) !
alice [10 11 12]
bank1 [13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
alice ([10 11 12],97)
! sell(shopx; alice; 5)!
The sell
nok
rule now applies because the customer only
has three tokens [10; 11; 12].
4.2.3 Scenario 3: double spending
QuickPay has been designed to be customer friendly. She
can refresh her carnet at any time, and even if she looses
the carnet, she promptly receives fresh tokens. We will
now use the model to study a scenario which mis-uses
this facility. Suppose that a customer makes a purchase,
and then immediately refreshes her carnet. Refreshing
the carnet will invalidate the tokens just oered to the
merchant, so that the latter is unable to clear the tokens.
The customer will only benet from her bad behaviour if
the merchant delivers the goods/services before clearing
the tokens. The merchant may wish to do so in order to
clear tokens in batch, and thus to amortise the cost of a
clear transaction over a larger number of tokens.
The rst step initialises the list of random numbers for
the broker (called bank1), as shown below:
bank1 [10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
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! update(alice; bank1; 2) !
After the update transaction, the carnet of customer alice
contains two value tokens, [10; 11]. The brokers vault con-
tains the duplicates and shows that the customers budget
is now 98:
alice [10 11]
bank1 [12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
alice ([10 11],98)
! stock(shopx; bank1; 4)!
After the stock transaction, the till of the merchant shopx
contains four authentication tokens, [12; 13; 14;15]. The
brokers vault contains the duplicates and shows that the
merchants account is 0:
bank1 [16 17 18 19]
alice ([10 11],98)
shopx ([12 13 14 15],0)
shopx [12 13 14 15]
! sell(shopx; alice; 1)!
The merchant has received the token 10 as payment from
the customer:
alice [11]
shopx [12 13 14 15]
alice [10]
! update(alice; bank1; 0) !
The customer updates her carnet, receiving two fresh to-
kens [16; 17]. The customer's budget is still 98. The bro-
ker's record also shows the new state of the carnet.
alice [16 17]
bank1 [18 19]
alice ([16 17],98)
shopx ([12 13 14 15],0)
! sell(shopx; alice; 1)!
The customer makes another purchase, this time spending
token 16. The merchant holds the old, invalid token 10 as
well as a new, valid token 16:
alice [17]
shopx [12 13 14 15]
alice [16 10]
! auth
m
(shopx; bank1) !
The broker accepts that the merchant is authentic by
agreeing that 12 is the rst authentication token:
bank1 [18 19]
alice ([16 17],98)
shopx ([13 14 15],0)
shopx [13 14 15]
alice [16 10]
! auth
b
(bank1; shopx) !
The merchant also accepts that the broker is authentic,
using token 13:
bank1 [18 19]
alice ([16 17],98)
shopx ([14 15],0)
shopx [14 15]
alice [16 10]
! clear(bank1; shopx; alice) !
At this stage the clearing fails because [16; 10] does not
match [16; 17]. The merchant account is not credited.
4.2.4 Scenario 4: fail to authenticate
A merchant may fail to authenticate, for example if the
customer and the merchant are not using the same broker
and the merchant uses the customers broker instead of his
own.
For the purpose of this example, we introduce a second
broker bank2 into the system. The new broker knows only
about shopx. Strictly speaking, this violates the constraint
of Section 3.1.3, which states that there is only one broker
in the system.
bank1 [10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
bank2 [20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29]
! update(alice; bank1; 2) !
alice [10 11]
bank1 [12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
alice ([10 11],98)
! stock(shopx; bank2; 3)!
bank2 [23 24 25 26 27 28 29]
shopx ([20 21 22],0)
shopx [20 21 22]
! sell(shopx; alice; 1)!
alice [11]
shopx [20 21 22]
alice [10]
! auth
m
(shopx; bank1) !
The authentication fails because bank1 does not know
shopx.
Having explored some examples of the behaviour of the
system we are now ready to study two problematic be-
haviours in more detail.
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5 Problems and solutions
One of the main concerns in the design of QuickPay has
been to make the protocols as ecient as possible. This
has resulted in a design that uses random numbers instead
of compute intensive cryptography and small messages
instead of large ones. The strive for eciency has brought
with it some (potential) problems that we should like to
address in this section.
5.1 Asymmetric authentication
We discovered a hitherto unknown problem whilst build-
ing the model of QuickPay. The stock transaction
serves to provide the merchant with authentication to-
kens. These tokens are used both to authenticate the
broker with the merchant and vice versa. It is conceivable
that a broker may take advantage of the knowledge how
these tokens are computed to trick the merchant. This
danger would not arise if both the broker and the mer-
chant would create their own list of tokens, which they
would then use to authenticate the other party. We have
not found a practical example that exploits this weakness.
5.2 Selecting lossy compression
To reduce the amount of data transmitted during a mul-
tiple token transfer, the prototype implementation of
QuickPay optimises payments of n > 1 value tokens in
the following way. Instead of transferring a list of tokens
[v
1
; : : : v
n
] the implementation transfers just the last one,
v
n
. We have termed this the selecting lossy compression,
because the optimisation compresses by selecting a token.
When clearing, the broker has a duplicate of the cus-
tomers carnet. The broker is thus able to look the token
v
n
up in the duplicate. Normally, the token will be found
at the n-th place, thus conrming both that the token is
valid, and that it represents n tokens.
The scenario below shows why the optimisation is not
correct.
5.2.1 Scenario 5: business with more merchants
In the scenario below, alice rst makes two purchases, one
at shopx and the second at shopy. The latter then success-
fully clears the token he has has just received from alice.
This is shown in the scenario below. However, with the
selecting lossy compression enabled, the broker would nd
the token received from shopy at position 2 in the dupli-
cate of alice's carnet. As a result shopy would be credited
by two tokens instead of just one. If shopx then tries to
clear its token, the broker will claim that it has already
been cleared, and refuse shopx its dues.
bank1 [10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
! update(alice; bank1; 3) !
alice [10 11 12]
bank1 [13 14 15 16 17 18 19]
alice ([10 11 12],97)
! stock(shopx; bank1; 4)!
bank1 [17 18 19]
alice ([10 11 12],97)
shopx ([13 14 15 16],0)
shopx [13 14 15 16]
! stock(shopy; bank1; 4)!
bank1 []
alice ([10 11 12],97)
shopx ([13 14 15 16],0)
shopy ([17 18 19],0)
shopy [17 18 19]
! sell(shopx; alice; 1)!
alice [11 12]
shopx [13 14 15 16]
alice [10]
! sell(shopy; alice; 1)!
alice [12]
shopy [17 18 19]
alice [11]
! auth
m
(shopy; bank1) !
bank1 []
alice ([10 11 12],97)
shopx ([13 14 15 16],0)
shopy ([18 19],0)
shopy [18 19]
alice [11]
! auth
b
(bank1; shopy)!
bank1 []
alice ([10 11 12],97)
shopx ([13 14 15 16],0)
shopy ([19],0)
shopy [19]
alice [11]
! clear(bank1; shopy; alice) !
At this stage we see that the token 11 in the merchants
records for alice occurs in the second place in the brokers
duplicate of alice's carnet.
Whilst building the QuickPay prototype we (re) discov-
ered that the selecting lossy compression optimisationwas
incorrect. We also found a dierent optimisation (adding
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lossy compression) which causes the scenario above to be-
have correctly. To study this new optimisation we applied
it to the model, uncovering another problem. This lead
us to a generalisation of compressing tokens, as well as a
range of optimisations.
This is the subject of the next section.
5.3 A correct solution
The idea of the new optimisation is to compress tokens
in a lossless way by treating some function of the value
tokens as a new compressed token (of type v say):
compress:: [v]!v;
The optimisation is correct only if there exists an expand
operation, which recovers the original tokens from the
compressed token. Therefore, the specication of expand
is:
expand :: v![v];
expand:compress= id;
To realise the lossless compression optimisation three
changes have to be made to the model.
 The merchant now has to record the new tokens v.
This changes the denitions of m, ms and s from Sec-
tion 3.1 to:
m  ([t]; id
c
* [v]);
ms id
m
* m;
s  (cs; bs; ms);
 In the sell
ok
rule of Section 3.2.2 the list of n to-
kens vs
c
c
is compressed into a singleton list. This
is achieved by replacing the function application
take(n; vs
c
c
) by [compress(take(n; vs
c
c
))].
 The clear
ok
rule of Section 3.2.6 has to expand out
the compressed tokens. Therefore, we replace the
premise ` vs
m
c
= vs
m
0
c
by ` expand vs
m
c
= vs
m
0
c
.
Note that the denition of expand has been extended
to lists of compressed tokens [v]; we will also extend the
denition to m, ms and s for use in the proof later.
The changes described above give rise to a new relation
qp
):
qp
)
:: h[tr]; si$h[tr]; si;
In the appendix we prove that the optimised relation
qp
) is a data renement of the unoptimised relation
qp
).
5.4 An ecient solution
In practice it is dicult to compress random data eec-
tively. To keep the cost of transaction down basically two
options are available. Both compromise the security of
the QuickPay scheme to an extent:
 Sacrice some of the `randomness' of the tokens. This
would allow customers to `guess' value tokens and
thus to defraud the broker.
 Use lossy compression. This, as we will show below,
allows the customer to defraud the merchant.
It is interesting to note how each of the alternatives
creates problems for a dierent party.
We have experimented with lossy compression func-
tions, whilst trying to avoid the extreme of the selecting
lossy compression described earlier. Lossy compression
functions do not have an inverse, so that the correctness
proof no longer holds.
Our proposed lossy compression function adds the to-
kens vs. To expand the tokens, the broker uses the cus-
tomers carnet to add the next n tokens and to check that
the sum equals the compressed token.
v  (n; v);
compress vs= (#vs;  vs);
The following subsection shows some problems that
might occur with the adding lossy compression. The rst
scenario is pessimistic and clears too few tokens, the sec-
ond is optimistic and clears too many.
5.4.1 Scenario 6: pessimistic optimisation
The scenario below makes three sell transactions and
then attempts to clear the tokens gathered all at
once. The `random' tokens produced by the broken are
not random at all, but the carefully chosen sequence
[0; 1; 2; 3;6;4; 5; 7;8;9]. The rst three tokens are used for
authentication purposes, and are not important for the
scenario. However, the following pair of tokens (3; 6) adds
up to 9, and so does the next pair (4; 5). During clearing,
the sum token 9 is expanded into 3 and 6, although it was
created from 4 and 5. Therefore, the two other tokens
cannot be expanded and the whole transaction fails. It
would have succeeded in the original, unoptimised proto-
col.
bank1 [0 1 2 3 6 4 5 7 8 9]
! stock(shopx; bank1; 3)!
bank1 [3 6 4 5 7 8 9]
shopx ([0 1 2],0)
shopx [0 1 2]
12
! update(alice; bank1; 4) !
alice [3 6 4 5]
bank1 [7 8 9]
alice ([3 6 4 5],96)
shopx ([0 1 2],0)
! sell(shopx; alice; 1)!
alice [6 4 5]
shopx [0 1 2]
alice [1,3]
! sell(shopx; alice; 1)!
alice [4 5]
shopx [0 1 2]
alice [1,6 1,3]
! sell(shopx; alice; 2)!
shopx [0 1 2]
alice [2,9 1,6 1,3]
! auth
m
(shopx; bank1) !
bank1 [7 8 9]
alice ([3 6 4 5],96)
shopx ([1 2],0)
shopx [1 2]
alice [2,9 1,6 1,3]
! auth
b
(bank1; shopx)!
bank1 [7 8 9]
alice ([3 6 4 5],96)
shopx ([2],0)
shopx [2]
alice [2,9 1,6 1,3]
! clear(bank1; shopx; alice) !
At this point the compressed token 9, which represents
two uncompressed tokens, is expanded into [3; 6].
5.4.2 Scenario 7: optimistic optimisation
The scenario below uses the same set of initial tokens as
above. This time the customer spends tokens 3 and 6, and
then refreshes her carnet (without increasing the value).
She receives tokens 4 and 5. When the merchant then
clears the sum token 9, everything appears to be in order,
because the customers present carnet oers two tokens
that also happen to add up to 9. In the unoptimised
protocol the clearing would have failed.
bank1 [0 1 2 3 6 4 5 7 8 9]
! stock(shopx; bank1; 3)!
bank1 [3 6 4 5 7 8 9]
shopx ([0 1 2],0)
shopx [0 1 2]
! update(alice; bank1; 2) !
alice [3 6]
bank1 [4 5 7 8 9]
alice ([3 6],98)
shopx ([0 1 2],0)
! sell(shopx; alice; 2)!
shopx [0 1 2]
alice [2,9]
! update(alice; bank1; 0) !
alice [4 5]
bank1 [7 8 9]
alice ([4 5],98)
shopx ([0 1 2],0)
! auth
m
(shopx; bank1) !
bank1 [7 8 9]
alice ([4 5],98)
shopx ([1 2],0)
shopx [1 2]
alice [2,9]
! auth
b
(bank1; shopx) !
bank1 [7 8 9]
alice ([4 5],98)
shopx ([2],0)
shopx [2]
alice [2,9]
! clear(bank1; shopx; alice) !
bank1 [7 8 9]
shopx ([2],2)
shopx [2]
Here the compressed token 9 is expanded into [4; 5], caus-
ing the clearing to succeed.
6 Conclusions and future work
A formal model of the QuickPay micro payment system
has been built that makes it possible:
 to clearly and concisely describe the transactions of
the system. The core transactions of the protocol
have been fully specied.
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 to animate sample transaction sequences so as to il-
lustrate the concepts and to explore scenarios of in-
correct uses of the system. Seven such sequences have
been presented.
 to identify potential problems and to study possible
solutions to these problems. A new problem has been
identied and an old problem (selecting lossy com-
pression) has been re-discovered. Various solutions
to the old problem are given, ranging from a provably
correct solution (lossless compression) to an ecient
solution (adding lossy compression).
The model has helped us to analyse the behaviour of
the protocols, leading to the conclusion that QuickPay is:
 attractive for the customer. Even if she looses her
tokens, they will be promptly replaced.
 attractive for the broker. Like all pre-paid schemes,
the broker is able to dispose of the (real) money of
the customer for a certain period of time.
 less attractive for the merchant. All problems that
we have studied are to the disadvantage of the mer-
chant. However, presently a merchant providing elec-
tronic services receives voluntary contributions at
best. With QuickPay the merchant might expect an
increase in revenue.
The model has been formulated rather abstractly, so
that in the prototype implementation there may well be
problems that are not captured by the model. The model
could be extended to cover more detail.
The model could also be extended to study the costs of
the transactions and to compare this costs to that of the
tokens being processed.
The model could be extended to capture histories of
customer and merchant behaviour. Such histories could
be used to decide if and when clearing of tokens is needed,
as well as other possible optimisations to the protocol.
The histories could also be used to assess to what extent
the merchant may take advantage of the knowledge of
customer behaviour.
Finally, the model could be generalised to capture other
micro payment systems, such as Mini-Pay, Millicent and
Payword/Micromint. Such a general model would enable
dierent micro payment systems to be compared on the
same formal footing.
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Figure 3: Inductive proof structure.
A Correctness of compression
To prove the correctness of lossless compression, we wish
to assert that the initial and nal congurations of the
optimised and unoptimised protocols are the same, mod-
ulo compression/expansion. This assertion is formalised
as follows:
Lemma
For all transaction sequences trs
0
, states (cs
0
; bs
0
;ms
0
),
compression and decompression functions satisfying
expand:compress = id and 0  k  #trs
0
we have:
htrs
0
; (cs
0
; bs
0
; compress ms
0
)i
qp
)
k
htrs
k
; (cs
k
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k
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k
)i
v
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)
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Proof
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of
steps k in the transaction sequence. Figure 3 illustrates
the proof strategy: Start with an initial conguration
htrs
0
; (cs
0
; bs
0
; ms
0
)i and proceed towards a new congu-
ration htrs
k
; (cs
k
; bs
k
; ms
k
)i in k steps. Given that the com-
pressed and expanded initial congurations are related by
ms
0
= compress ms
0
then we wish to show that the nal
congurations are related by expand ms
k
= ms
k
.
The proof of the base case uses
expand:compress ms
0
= ms
0
, which follows immedi-
ately from the requirement that expand is the inverse of
compress.
To prove the general case, we perform case analy-
sis on tr
k
. This means that we should look at each of
the rules dening the relations
qp
) and
qp
), and prove
that from the induction hypothesisms
k 1
= expand ms
k 1
and the properties of the appropriate rule we also have
ms
k
= expand ms
k
.
Firstly, assume that tr
k
is a failed transaction, that is
the side condition of the appropriate rule is false; then
expand ms
k
 f : : :
nok
transactions preserve ms g
expand ms
k 1
v f induction hypothesis g
ms
k 1
 f : : :
nok
transactions preserve ms g
ms
k
Secondly, consider a successful update transaction. If
tr
k
= Update(id
c
; id
b
; n) then Update
ok
does not aect ms
or ms, so the reasoning above as for the failed transaction
applies here also.
Thirdly, let tr
k
= Sell(id
m
; id
c
; n). The transaction Sell
ok
both uses and changes the merchant data, therefore we
must consider the actions of the rule in detail. Consider
how the premises of the rule Sell
ok
relate ms
k 1
and ms
k
:
ms
k 1
(id
m
) = (ts
m
; cs
m
)
cs
m
(id
c
) =

vs
m
c
cs
m
 fid
c
7! [compress(take(n; vs
c
c
))] ++

vs
m
c
g =

cs
0
m
(ts
m
;

cs
0
m
) =

m
0
ms
k 1
 fid
m
7!

m
0
g = ms
k
 f extension of expand c.f. Section 5.3 g
(expand ms
k 1
)(id
m
) = (ts
m
; expand cs
m
)
(expand cs
m
)(id
c
) = expand

vs
m
c
(expand cs
m
) fid
c
7! [expand(compress(take(n; vs
c
c
)))]
++ expand

vs
m
c
g = expand

cs
0
m
(ts
m
; expand

cs
0
m
) = expand

m
0
(expand ms
k 1
) fid
m
7! expand

m
0
g = expand ms
k
v f hypothesis, expand:compress = id g
ms
k 1
(id
m
) = (ts
m
; cs
m
)
cs
m
(id
c
) = vs
m
c
cs
m
 fid
c
7! (take(n; vs
c
c
) ++vs
m
c
)g = cs
0
m
(ts
m
; cs
0
m
) = m
0
ms
k 1
 fid
m
7! m
0
g = ms
k
Fourthly, let tr
k
= Clear(id
b
; id
m
; id
c
). The transaction
Clear
ok
also uses and changes the merchant record. Study-
ing how the premises relate ms
k 1
and ms
k
yields:
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ms
k 1
fid
m
g = (ts
m
m
; cs
m
)
cs
m
fid
c
g =

vs
m
c
expand

vs
m
c
= vs
m
0
c
(ts
m
m
; cs
m
 fid
c
7! []g) =

m
0
ms
k 1
 fid
m
7!

m
0
g = ms
k
 f extension of expand g
(expand ms
k 1
)fid
m
g = (ts
m
m
; expand cs
m
)
(expand cs
m
)fid
c
g = expand

vs
m
c
expand

vs
m
c
= vs
m
0
c
(ts
m
m
; expand cs
m
 fid
c
7! []g) = expand

m
0
(expand ms
k 1
)  fid
m
7!

m
0
g = expand ms
k
v f hypothesis, extension of expand g
ms
k 1
fid
m
g = (ts
m
m
; cs
m
)
cs
m
fid
c
g = vs
m
c
vs
m
c
= vs
m
0
c
(ts
m
m
; cs
m
 fid
c
7! []g) = m
0
ms
k 1
 fid
m
7! m
0
g = ms
k
Finally, the remaining rules stock
ok
, auth
ok
m
and
auth
ok
b
do not actually use or change the customer to-
kens in the merchant records, which completes the proof.
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